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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS UAV 41939 
COURT OF APPEALS 
CENTURY 21 GOLDEN WEST, INC., : 
a Utah corporation, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant,: 
: Court of Appeals No. 
v. : 890184-CA 
SECURITY TITLE AND ABSTRACT : (Supreme Ct. No. 890043) 
COMPANY, : 
Defendant/Respondent: 
AUTHORITY FOR REVIEW 
Section 78-2-2(3)(1) U.C.A., 1953, as amended in 1987, and 
effective January 1, 1988, confers appellate jurisdiction on the 
Supreme Court over all "orders, judgments, and decrees of any 
court of record over which the Court of Appeals does not have 
original appellate jurisdiction". An examination of Title 78-2a-
3 U.C.A., concerning the Court of Appeals1 jurisdiction, reveals 
that it does not have jurisdiction over the appeal in this case 
concerning the trial court's dismissal of an action for relief 
from judgment. However, pursuant to notice from the Supreme 
Court dated March 24, 1989, and pursuant to Section 78-2-2(4) 
U.C.A., 1953, as amended, effective January 1, 1988, and pursuant 
to R. Utah S. Ct and R. Utah Ct. App. 4(a),(b), the Supreme Court 
transferred this appeal to the Court of Appeals. 
//// 
//// 
//// 
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FILED 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW """ '989 
COURT OF APPEALS 
The proceedings below involved an action for relief from the 
second of two contradictory rulings entered in a prior action; 
one ruling in favor of Century 21 by the original trial Judge, 
and a second subsequent contradictory ruling in favor of Security 
Title entered by a successor Judge on the same facts and without 
any new or additional evidence. 
-b-
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CENTURY 21 GOLDEN WEST, INC., : 
a Utah corporation, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant,: 
: Court of Appeals No. 
v. : 890184-CA 
SECURITY TITLE AND ABSTRACT : (Supreme Ct. No. 890043) 
COMPANY, 
Defendant/Respondent: 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The issues raised by the Plaintiff/Appellant, Century 21 
Golden West, Inc., a Utah corporation, (hereinafter called 
"Plaintiff" or "Century 21") are as follows: 
1. Whether a Successor District Court Judge has the 
authority and jurisdiction to reverse and/or modify (without new 
or additional evidence) the prior written final ruling of the 
original Trial Judge? 
2. With respect to the immediately preceding issue, 
whether a Successor Judge can reverse and/or modify the prior 
written final ruling of his predecessor, after the Successor 
Judge determined that he is in agreement with, signed, and 
entered the predecessor's ruling? 
3. Whether the trial court in this instant case erred in 
dismissing the Plaintiff/Appellant's action for relief from 
prior judgment wherein Judge Ballif applied the requirements of a 
1 
Texas federal case dealing with the issue of fraud to this case, 
where no fraud was committed or alleged by either party against 
the other? 
4, Whether Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
allows Century 21, against whom a final judgment has issued, to 
proceed in the alternative with either an appeal, or by 
independent action? 
5. Whether the scope of using an independent action to 
obtain relief from a judgment, allowed under Rule 60(b) U.R.C.P., 
is limited such that said procedure cannot be used in this 
instant case, contrary to the express language of the Rule? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case. 
This case involves a civil action (CV 88-416) by the 
Plaintiff Century 21 for relief from the second of two Judgments 
entered in a prior civil case #69561 (both in the Fourth District 
Court). The first Judgment in the prior case was in Plaintiff's 
favor. It was in the form of a Minute Entry (dated March 21, 
1986) drafted by the original Trial Judge (David Sam). The 
Minute Entry Order or Judgment was read, approved, signed, and 
entered by the Successor Judge, Boyd Park, after Judge Sam 
assumed a new Federal Judgeship. The second Judgment (the one 
from which relief is being sought in the instant action) was a 
reversal of the first Judgment and was made almost one year after 
the entry of the first Judgment. The second Judgment was entered 
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by the Successor Judge, Boyd Park without the presentation of any 
new evidence in the case and resulted from a proposed Summary 
Judgment prepared by Security Title, the terms of which were 
opposite and contradictory to the provisions of the previously 
entered first Judgment Ruling (of Judge David Sam). 
2. The Course of Proceeding, 
On May 10, 1985, a civil action was filed in the Fourth 
District Court under # 69561 (hereinafter called "Original 
Action" or "First Action"). The Plaintiff here (Century 21) was 
the Defendant there and the Defendant here (Security Title) was 
the Plaintiff there. After submission of all pleadings in the 
Original Action regarding a Summary Judgment Motion filed by 
Security Title, the original Trial Court, Judge David Sam, 
examined all of the evidence and pleadings and drafted a Minute 
Entry ruling dated March 31, 1986 (See Exhibit "A"). Prior to 
the execution of the Minute Entry Ruling in the Original Action 
on Security Title's Summary Judgment Motion, Judge David Sam left 
the State Court bench and assumed a Federal Judgeship in Salt 
Lake. Judge Sam never signed his own Minute Entry Ruling, 
although it had been prepared and type-written. The successor 
Judge was Judge Boyd Park who assumed the State Court Bench as 
the successor to and in place of Judge Sam. After assuming his 
new responsibilities, the successor Judge Park read Judge Samfs 
Minute Entry Ruling, agreed with it, signed Judge Sam's ruling 
and caused the same to be entered under the date of March 31, 
1986 (see Exhibit "A"; Record pp. 37-38). 
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The March 31, 1986 ruling prepared by Judge Sam and signed 
and entered by Judge Park denied Security Titlefs request for 
Summary Judgment of $5,000.00, against Century 21. Approximately 
seven (7) months later, a Summary Judgment document proposed by 
Security Title's attorney, Robert Moody, was presented to counsel 
for Century 21 and the Court. Century 21!s attorney objected to 
the proposed Summary Judgment document because its terms 
completely contradicted the Minute Entry Ruling of Judge Sam 
(i.e. it granted a $5,000 Judgment against Century 21). The 
Court set oral arguments on the objection to the proposed Summary 
Judgment for February 20, 1987, before Judge Park (See Exhibit 
"B"; record pp. 84-87). A hearing was held on the objections to 
the proposed Summary Judgment in the original action on February 
20, 1987, almost one year after the entry of Judge Sam's original 
ruling. THERE WAS NO NEW EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE COURT ON 
FEBRUARY 20, 1987. After the February 20, 1987, hearing, the 
Successor Judge Park reversed the previously entered ruling of 
Judge Sam (which Judge Park had signed and entered for Judge Sam) 
and issued a new Judgment for Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) 
in favor of Security Title and against Century 21 (the opposite 
result from that which Judge Sam had reached). 
There is no Minute Entry or Order in the Court file 
vacating the Original and Previously Entered Order denying 
Security Title's requested relief. There existed from that point 
on in the Original Action two contradictory Judgments or Orders 
of the same Court, one from the original Trial Judge, based upon 
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the evidence in the matter denying relief to Security Title 
against Century 21, and the second, issued by the Successor Judge 
without new evidence, granting the relief requested by Security 
Title against Century 21. The proposed Summary Judgment was 
entered in the original action on or about March 4, 1987, under 
the signature of Judge Park (see Exhibit "C"; Record pp. 90-94). 
On March 3, 1988, (within one year) Century 21 filed this action 
for relief from the second of the two original Judgments in the 
Fourth District Court (Record pps. 1-5). An Amended Complaint 
was thereafter filed by Century 21 on or about March 31, 1988 
(See Exhibit "F"; Record pp. 6-11). 
On or about April 14, 1988, Security Title filed a 
Motion to Dismiss Century 21fs Complaint. Briefs and Memoranda 
were filed with the Court by both parties. Thereafter, Motions 
for Summary Judgment was filed with the New Trial Court by the 
new Plaintiff Century 21 on or about May 19, 1988. Again, briefs 
were filed with the Court by both parties. 
The Judge in the New Action was George E. Bailiff. 
Century 21fs Summary Judgment Motion and Security Title's Motion 
to Dismiss were both submitted to the new Trial Court for 
decision on or about June 21, 1988-. On July 19, 1988, Judge 
Bailiff issued his ruling (see Exhibit lfDI!; Record pp. 59-62), 
denying the Plaintifffs Motion for Summary Judgment and granting 
the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Thereafter, on or about July 
22, 1988, a formal order was prepared and submitted to the Court 
for signature (the date of entry is unknown). On July 28, 1988, 
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the new Plaintiff Century 21 filed a Motion to Amend the July 19, 
1988, ruling of the Court, seeking to amend one sentence of the 
ruling so that it complied with the underlying facts of the 
previous First Action. Thereafter, an amended Motion to Amend 
the July 19, 1988, Ruling of the Court was filed by the Plaintiff 
on August 29, 1988. Memoranda were thereafter filed with the 
Court by both parties with regard to the Motion to Amend the 
Court's ruling. The Plaintiff Century 21 filed a Notice to 
Submit its Motion to Amend on or about December 19, 1988. The 
Court, Judge George E. Bailiff, issued a ruling denying the 
Plaintiff/Appellant's Motion to Amend the July 19, 1988, ruling 
under date of January 17, 1989. This appeal follows. 
3, The Disposition in the Lower Court. 
The Lower Court dismissed Century 21fs action for 
relief from the second of two contradictory Judgments/Rulings 
entered in the first action, No. 69561 in the Fourth District 
Court. 
4. The Statement of the Facts. 
UNCONTESTED FACTS 
1. The procedural facts set forth in Section 2, supra, are 
incorporated herein as if fully set forth. 
2. The first original action filed by Security Title as a 
Plaintiff was filed under action No. 69561 in the Fourth District 
Court on May 10, 1985. 
3. In the First Action, Security Title filed a Summary 
Judgment Motion which resulted in a ruling by the then Trial 
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Court Judge David Sam in favor of Century 21 (See Exhibit "A"; 
Record pp. 37-39)• 
4. Part of Judge Sam's ruling in the First Action dealt 
with Security Title's request for relief or Judgment against 
Century 21 in the amount of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00). 
Judge Sam's original ruling denied that relief (See paragraph 2 
of Exhibit "A"; Record p. 38). 
5. A successor Judge was appointed to the State Court 
Bench in place of Judge Sam. The successor Judge was Boyd Park. 
6. The successor Judge Park read, approved and entered 
Judge Sam's ruling in the first action in the form of a Minute 
Entry dated March 31, 1986. The Minute Entry had previously been 
prepared and type-written by or for or at the direction of Judge 
Sam (See record, pps. 42-43, and See Exhibit "E"). 
7. Security Title's attorney waited seven (7) months after 
the entry of Judge Sam's ruling (by Judge Park) before preparing 
a proposed Summary Judgment document (knowing Judge Sam was 
leaving the State Court bench and apparently hoping to get the 
new Judge to reverse Sam's Ruling). (See Exhibit "B".) 
8. Century 21's attorney of record filed an objection to 
the proposed Summary Judgment, after which the Court, through 
Judge Park, set oral arguments regarding the objection to the 
proposed Summary Judgment for February 20, 1987. 
9. A hearing was held on February 20, 1987, at which time, 
oral arguments were heard, but no new evidence was offered, nor 
was any testimony taken. 
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10. After the February 20, 1987 hearing, (almost one year 
after Judge Sam's ruling had been entered by Judge Park on March 
31, 1986) Judge Park reversed Judge Sam's ruling (which he [Park] 
had previously approved, signed and entered) and awarded the Five 
Thousand Dollar relief originally requested by Security Title in 
its Summary Judgment in the First Action. 
11. Judge Sam denied the $5,000 requested relief against 
Century 21 on equitable grounds as stated in his March 31, 1986 
Ruling (see Paragraph 1 thereof) (see Exhibit "A"; Record pp. 37-
38) . 
12. The instant action for relief from judgment was timely 
filed (this fact is not disputed). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Judge David Sam was the trial Judge who, after 
considering the Summary Judgment Motion of Security Title, caused 
a typewritten Minute Entry Ruling, dated March 31, 1986, to be 
prepared, showing his (Sam's) findings, conclusions and Judgment, 
which denied Security Title's requested relief of $5000.00 
against Century 21. Judge Sam left the State Court bench prior 
to signing his own ruling. The successor Judge Boyd Park, 
assumed the State Court bench, read, agreed with, signed, and 
caused to entered in the Court record Judge Sam's March 31, 1986 
Ruling in favor of Century 21 and against Security Title. 
Security Title's Attorney was supposed to draft the Order of 
Judgment of the Court in conformity with Judge Sam's ruling. 
Security Title's attorney waited more than seven months before 
preparing said Judgment. When Security did prepare the Judgment, 
it prepared a Judgment document which was opposite and completely 
contradictory to Judge Sam's Ruling with respect to Century 21. 
The proposed Summary Judgment granted a $5000.00 Judgment against 
Century 21 instead of denying that relied in accordance with 
Judge Sam's Ruling (which denied that requested relief). 
3. Century 211's Counsel filed a written objection to the 
proposed Judgment document because it did not reflect Judge Sam's 
ruling. The successor Judge Park set a hearing for oral 
arguments on Century 21fs objection to the proposed Judgment 
which hearing was had on February 20, 1987, almost one full year 
after the entry of Judge Sam's ruling. No new evidence or 
testimony was presented at the February 20, 1987 hearing, but 
despite that fact Judge Park reversed Judge Sam's Ruling and 
stated from the bench that he would grant a $5000.00 judgment in 
favor of Security Title and against Century 21 (the opposite 
result from that which Judge Sam had reached). This result 
obtained from the substantial delay of Security Title's Counsel 
in preparing a Judgment Document, in violation of Rule 2.9 of the 
Rules of Practice of the District Courts. 
4. Security Title's attorney proposed a written Judgment 
reflecting Judge Park's decision of February 20, 1987, which new 
Order of Judgment was entered in the record of the Court on March 
4, 1987, nearly one (1) full year after the entry of Judge Sam's 
ruling. No Order exists vacating Judge Sam's earlier ruling, 
which left the Court record in a position containing two 
contradictory rulings, one by the Trial Judge, and the second, a 
contradictory ruling, by the successor Judge in a subsequent term 
of the Court. 
5. All of the authorities as cited in the Brief, infra, 
clearly and unequivocally support the position and the rule of 
law that a successor Judge may not reverse, remand or modify the 
final ruling of the predecessor Trial Judge. Judge Park's 
actions in reversing Judge Sam's ruling under circumstances where 
Judge Park had no new evidence and no new testimony before him 
except for those facts which were before the predecessor Trial 
Judge, was an illegal act and should be declared null and void by 
this Court. The original Judgment of Judge Sam should be allowed 
to stand, which Judgment was in favor of Century 21 and denied 
relief to Security Title, in accordance with Judge Sam's written 
ruling. 
6. This Summary of Argument through this paragraph covers 
Issues #1 and #2 of the Appeal. 
7. As to Issue #3 raised on appeal, Judge Ballif clearly 
erred in dismissing Century 21's independent action for relief 
from the second of two contradictory Judgments reached in the 
first action, which second Judgment was entered by Judge Park on 
March 4, 1987. Judge Ballifs interpretation of Rule 60 U.R.C.P. 
to the effect that an independent action can be brought only if 
it is couched in terms of fraud or misrepresentation is clearly 
wrong. The law appears to be to the contrary, that is, that an 
independent action must be brought rather than a Motion under 
Rule 60(b) in the event of fraud or misrepresentation; however, 
an independent action is or should be allowed for any of the 
other reasons listed in Rule 60, including the circumstances 
which exist in the instant case, where two contradictory rulings 
were reached in the first action, one by the Trial Judge and a 
contradictory Judgment reached subsequently by a successor Judge 
in a successive term of the Court. This is particularly true 
where the Trial Judge based upon equitable considerations and 
under circumstances where he found that Security Title acted 
unreasonably in prematurely disbursing escrowed funds prior to 
clearing the deposited check, which was a foreign, out-of-the-
country check which, in fact, turned out to be a fraudulent 
instrument. Because of that finding by Judge Sam, Judge Sam 
denied Security Title's requested $5,000.00 relief against 
Century 21. When Judge Park, the successor Judge, in a 
successive term of the Court, reversed Judge Sam's ruling, he did 
so without contemplating and considering the equitable 
circumstances and findings of Judge Sam which were in accordance 
with the evidence before Judge Sam. It is significant that Judge 
Park received no new evidence or no new testimony whatsoever, but 
reVersed Judge Sam's ruling and Judgment on the same facts and 
same evidence as that which was before Judge Sam in the first 
place. Certainly, an independent action should be allowed 
Century 21 in order to gain relief from Judge Park's second 
Judgment and to obtain a ruling reinstating the first Judgment of 
11 
Judge Sam as the controlling Judgment in the First Cause oJ 
Action. 
8 As to Issues #4 and #5, they relate to the procedural 
question whether Century 21 can correctly proceed with a timely, 
independent action, rather than pursuing an appeal of Judge 
Park's decision. With respect to this issue, Rule 60 and its 
sub-paragraphs are clear on their face. The Rule specifically 
states that "any relief" may be pursued by means of an 
independent action. The use or scope of an independent action is 
not limited under the Rule, and in accordance with Rule 1 
U.R.C.P., the language of Rule 60 should be liberally construed 
to allow the relief requested by Century 21 in this case. The 
Committee Notes with respect to Federal Rule 60, as well as an 
examination of pertinent Utah case rulings with respect to that 
Rule, seem to make it clear that Judge Ballif's dismissal of 
Century 21fs independent action was error and that the reasoning 
of Judge Ballif is in error. That is, an independent action can 
be brought for any of the reasons under Rule 60(b) and its scope 
is not limited to fraud and misrepresentation as incorrectly 
stated by Judge Ballif in his dismissal ruling. The Court is 
urged to read the full Brief of the Plaintiff in this matter, 
rather than relying on this sketchy summary of the Argument. 
1 O 
ARGUMENT AND ANALYSIS 
ISSUE #1, WHETHER A SUCCESSOR DISTRICT COURT JUDGE HAS THE 
AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION TO REVERSE AND/OR MODIFY (WITHOUT NEW 
OR ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE) THE PRIOR WRITTEN FINAL RULING OF THE 
ORIGINAL TRIAL JUDGE? 
1. The judgment and decision of the Trial Judge, David Sam, 
with respect to the Rule 56 Summary Judgment Motion of Security 
Title in the first action, was consistent and complied with the 
requirements of Rule 52 U.R.C.P.. 
2. Rule 52(b) provides: 
Upon motion of a party made not later than 
ten days after entry of judgment, the Court 
may amend itfs findings or make additional 
findings and may amend the judgment 
accordingly. 
3. There is no provision in Rule 52 which allows a 
successor judge to amend, reverse, or modify the findings and 
judgment of the original Trial Judge, without a motion of a party 
(or possibly where new evidence is presented). In the instant 
case, there was no motion filed by Security Title to amend the 
March 31, 1986, Ruling of Judge David Sam. Accordingly, a 
successor judge was powerless to amend, modify, or revise the 
findings, ruling, and judgment of his predecessor. (Further 
argument and authority on this point is contained below.) 
4. In the Utah case of State v. Kelsey, 532 P.2d 1001 (Ut. 
1975), our Utah Supreme Court dealt with a fact situation in 
which the trial judge stated his findings and judgment on the 
record, but retired before a final written judgment was entered. 
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The successor judge, after the fact, entered findings of fact and 
conclusions of law consistent with the findings and judgment of 
the trial judge. Our Utah Supreme Court stated as follows: 
The final point raised by the defendant is 
that the findings of fact and the trial and 
proceedings upon which his conviction rests 
were incomplete because the judge who tried 
the case, Frank Wilkins, did not enter the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, but 
this was done by a successor judge..,. As to 
the authority of the latter to perform that 
duty, Rule 63(a) U.R.C.P., provides: "If by 
reason of death, sickness, or other 
disability a judge before whom an action has 
been tried is unable to perform the duties to 
be performed by the court under these rules 
after a verdict is returned or findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are filed, then 
any other judge regularly sitting in or 
assigned to the court in which the action was 
tried may perform those duties. . . . It is 
plainly apparent from the generality of the 
phrase, "or other disability" that the rule 
is not limited to mere mental or physical 
disability, but extends to any disability 
whatsoever, including resignation of the 
judge. Inasmuch as the stated findings and 
verdict of Judge Wilkins at the conclusion of 
the trial were sufficient to meet the 
requirements of Rule 52, U.R.C.P., there can 
be no question about the authority or 
propriety of the successor judge to make and 
sign formal findings of fact and conclusions 
of law which were consistent with the 
findings and verdict of the judge who 
actually tried the case. [Emphasis added] 
5. As in the case of State v. Kelsey, supra, the successor 
judge in this case read, agreed with, signed, and entered the 
findings and ruling of the predecessor trial judge. According to 
the Kelsey case this was proper and within the jurisdiction and 
authority of the successor judge. 
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6. However, the successor judge in the instant case went 
far beyond his authority when, almost one year after the ruling 
of the Trial Judge Sam had been entered by the successor judge, 
the successor judge, without hearing any additional evidence, 
listened to arguments of counsel, and reversed the judgement of 
his predecessor and entered a contrary and contradictory 
judgment. There is absolutely no dispute in this case as to the 
fact that the original March 31, 1986 Minute Entry Ruling of 
Judge Sam was prepared by Judge Sam, the original Trial Judge. 
Judge Park made that clear at the February 20, 1987 hearing, a 
transcript of which (at least in part) is part of this record on 
appeal, and is found at page 42 thereof. At that hearing, held 
in the original action, Judge Park stated as follows: 
THE COURT: Okay we are here this morning on 
Security Title and Abstract Company plaintiff 
vs. Dick Casper, Et Al, defendants and there 
were some cross claims or whatever this is 
something that [be]came before Judge Sam. 
Judge Sam had actually written the ruling in 
this matter but he had not signed it before 
he was elevated to the Federal Bench. I 
reviewed the file, reviewed his Judgment and 
I felt that it was fair under the 
circumstances and therefore I adopted his 
decision and that is the basis of the ruling 
that came out on March 31, 1986. (See copy 
of Transcript attached hereto as Exhibit "E"; 
Record p. 42 - lines 18 through 25, and p.43 
- lines 1 and 2.) 
THE COURT: I understand what you are saying. 
I think this is why Judge Sam did what he 
did. 
MR. JEPSON: Right. 
THE COURT: And I simply just signed his 
Judgment for him since he was gone and he had 
already rendered it....(See copy of 
15 
Transcript attached hereto as Exhibit "E"; 
Record p. 44 - lines 1 through 8). 
7. The treatise authorities in the area provide the 
following persuasive comments: 
. . . A court retains its identity regardless 
of a change of its functionaries, the 
judicial powers and duties of a judge, such 
as deceased or departing judge, as part of 
the court, devolve on his successor, or on 
the surviving or remaining judges. This rule 
applies to unfinished business or unperformed 
duties. . ~. I It is incumbent upon the 
succeeding judge, when a proper motion is 
made before him, to enforce a lawful order 
made by his predecessor . . . . and it has 
been broadly stated that a successor judge 
may complete any acts uncompleted by his 
predecessor 
successor to 
. . An 
judge, 
where th 
compare 
official 
but left 
act 
eY 
an 
do not 
Ld weigh 
manifes 
unfinis hed, 
ted 
may 
require 
testimony 
by 
be 
the 
. . 
the first 
completed 
by his successor, but a court rule to this 
effect, applicable in case of disability, may 
be invoked only where a complete and final 
decision has been rendered by the disabled 
judge. More particularly, the successor 
judge may issue rulings on pending motions, 
or requests, which do not involve reargument 
of earlier rulings, . . . . (See 48A C.J.S. 
649, 650.) 
Furthermore, he (meaning the successor judge) 
cannot enter a nunc pro tunc order sentencing 
accused in a criminal prosecution based on a 
written memorandum of the trial judge in the 
absence of a minute entry by him approving 
the verdict and imposing the sentence. 
[Emphasis added.] (See 48 A C.J.S. 652.) 
. . . A successor judge cannot correct errors 
of law committed by his predecessor . . . . 
He cannot review, modify, reverse, or vacate, 
on the merits, on the same facts, the final 
orders of his predecessor, . . . .or under 
the guise of clarification or 
interpretation, especially orders which were 
rendered at a past term, and he may not 
modify or reverse findings of fact or 
1 a 
conclusions of law, (See 48A C.J.S. 654 
Section 68.) 
8. From the above quote, another point becomes abundantly 
clear. The judgement or order contained in Judge Sam's Minute 
Entry dated March 31, 1986, was rendered in the term of the court 
held in 1986. The reversal of that judgement by the successor 
Judge Park, did not come until a subsequent term of the court 
held in 1987. It is clear from the treatise authority, supra, 
that reversals of a predecessor judge's ruling cannot be made 
under the guise of clarification or interpretation, and 
especially not in a subsequent term of the court. The terms of 
the court are defined in the Utah Code Annotated, Section 
78-3-9 as annual terms or as terms within each calendar year, and 
mandate that the judges of the district courts shall fix the 
terms for the subsequent year in December of each year. Black's 
Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition (1968) at page 1640 
defines the term of the court as follows: 
The term of the court is the time prescribed 
by law during which it may be in session. . . 
A session signifies the time during the term 
when the court sits during the transaction of 
business . . . 
9. It is or should be clear from the above citations, that 
a successor judge cannot in a subsequent calendar year or 
subsequent term of the court, reverse, modify, or amend the final 
written order of findings of his predecessor trial judge, when 
those findings, or ruling, or judgment were made in compliance 
with Rule 52 U.R.C.P.. 
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10. In the case of Michel vs. Michel, 297 N.Y.S.,So.2d 250, 
at 253, the Supreme Court of New York held, regarding the powers 
authority or jurisdiction of a successor judge, as follows: 
The right to have a decision made by the 
trial judge who presided over the entire 
matter is so basic and fundamental that it is 
not waived by the failure of counsel to 
object at the time of the hearing. 
. . . It was error for one judge to preside 
at a hearing on a writ of error coram nobis 
and a second judge to make the decision, even 
through in the interim the first judge had 
retired from office. 
11. In the case of Doane v. Rapp, 453 So.2d 1197, the 
District Court of Appeals of the State of Florida, Third 
District, stated in 1984, the following regarding the authority 
of a successor judge: 
The order under review setting aside a 
factual judgment entered by a predecessor 
judge is vacated because the successor judge 
who granted that relief did not have 
authority to do so . . . . [emphasis added] 
12. In the case of David v. Goodman, 250 P.2d 704, the 
District Court of Appeal, Division Two of State of California, 
held regarding the powers and authority of a successor judge as 
follows: 
A party litigant is entitled to a decision 
upon the facts of his case from the judge who 
hears the evidence, where the matter is tried 
without a jury . . . . He cannot be 
compelled to accept a decision upon other 
facts from another judge . . . . It was held 
to be error, in the absence of consent or 
waiver, for the second judge to make findings 
and decide material issues from the evidence 
introduced before the judge who presided over 
the first hearing ....[emphasis added] 
13. Again, in the case of Paragon Group, Inc. v. Hoeksema, 
574 S.2d 244 at 245, the District Court of Appeal of the STate of 
Florida held in 1985 concerning the powers of a successor judge 
as follows: 
A successor judge may complete acts left 
unfinished by a predecessor, but may not 
weigh the testimony heard before the 
predecessor judge . . . . A successor judge 
may not rule on a party's motion for 
rehearing where the original trial judge has 
been assigned to a different division of the 
circuit court. 
14. In still another case, McBride v. McBride, 352 S.2d 244 
at 245, the District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida held 
in 1985 concerning the powers of a successor judge as follows 
As grounds for reversal, appellant urges that 
the successor trial judge was without 
jurisdiction or authority to modify the final 
order of his predecessor. Generally, in the 
absence of mistake or fraud, a successor 
judge cannot review, modify or reverse, upon 
the merits on the same facts, the final 
orders of his predecessor. [Emphasis added] 
15. In still another case, Thompkins Land and Housing, Inc. 
v. White, 431 So.2d, 259 (Fla. App. 2 Dist. 1983), the District 
Court of Appeal of the State of California, in a 1983 decision 
held concerning the powers of a successor Judge as follows: 
A successor judge may complete acts left 
uncompleted by a predecessor but may not 
weigh and compare testimony heard before the 
other judge. [Emphasis added] 
16. The bottom line conclusion from the above controlling, 
persuasive and secondary authorities is that a successor judge 
may complete tasks and acts left undone by his predecessor trial 
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judge so long as such tasks and acts are completed in a manner 
which are consistent with and in harmony with the rulings of the 
predecessor. 
17. In the instant case, Judge Park, acting in his capacity 
as a successor judge, signed and entered Judge Samfs March 31, 
1986, minute entry ruling, which clearly contained the 
determinations of the evidence and the conclusions of law and 
judgment reached by Judge Sam in accordance with Rule 52 U.R.C.P. 
In completing the tasks of the predecessor, Judge Park was within 
his authority and jurisdiction. However, when Judge Park took 
upon himself to amend and reverse the Judgment of Judge Sam, 
approximately one year after the fact, and in a subsequent term 
of court and without hearing any new or additional evidence or 
testimony, and clearly without considering the equitable grounds 
of his predecessor's ruling, Judge Park's entry of the March 4, 
1987 Summary Judgment document was outside of his authority and 
should be declared null and void. The original ruling of the 
trial judge, David Sam, should be allowed to stand as the 
decision in the case and relief should be afforded Century 21 
from the second Judgment entered in the first action. 
ISSUE #2. WITH RESPECT TO THE IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING ISSUE, 
WHETHER A SUCCESSOR JUDGE CAN REVERSE AND/OR MODIFY THE PRIOR 
WRITTEN FINAL RULING OF HIS PREDECESSOR, AFTER THE SUCCESSOR 
JUDGE DETERMINED THAT HE IS IN AGREEMENT WITH, SIGNED, AND 
ENTERED THE PREDECESSOR'S RULING? 
18. This second issue is identical to Issue No. 1, except 
that it includes the fact that a successor judge acted in 
on 
agreeing with, signing, and entering the predecessor's ruling, 
prior to making a contradictory ruling at a subsequent point in 
time. Based upon the authorities cited herein, supra and infra, 
the conclusion which clearly must be reached is that the 
successor judge may not act in a manner which contradicts or 
reverses the final ruling and judgment of the predecessor trial 
judge who weighed and determined the evidence in reaching his 
conclusion/ruling in the case. 
ISSUE #3. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT IN THIS INSTANT CASE ERRED IN 
DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT'S ACTION FOR RELIEF FROM PRIOR 
JUDGMENT WHEREIN JUDGE BALLIF APPLIED THE REQUIREMENTS OF A TEXAS 
FEDERAL CASE DEALING WITH THE ISSUE OF FRAUD TO THIS CASE, WHERE 
NO FRAUD WAS COMMITTED OR ALLEGED BY EITHER PARTY AGAINST THE 
OTHER? 
19. Judge Bailiff's ruling (see record, pps. 59-62; Exhibit 
"D") correctly states the history of the case and the positions 
of the parties in the first four paragraphs thereof, except for 
the last sentence beginning on page one of the ruling (page 59 of 
the record; page one of Exhibit "D"). The objections referred to 
in Judge Balliffs ruling were objections filed by this counsel to 
the proposed Summary Judgment prepared by Security Title in the 
first action. The objections were not to Judge Sam's ruling as 
that ruling was in favor of Century 21 (my client). Aside from 
that inaccuracy in Judge Ballif's ruling, Judge Ballif's 
statement of the parties' positions in this new action is 
accurate. 
20. Judge Ballif sidestepped the issue of authority or 
jurisdiction on the part of a successor judge to amend or reverse 
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the ruling of his predecessor. Although Judge Ballif clearly 
identifies this as an issue, which has therefore been included in 
this appeal, he does not answer or state a resolution to that 
issue. Rather, the Trial Court (Judge Ballif) in this new action 
for relief from Judgment, ruled with respect to Rule 60 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as follows: 
. . . Rule 60 of the Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that the procedure for obtaining 
relief [f]rom a judgment shall be by motion 
or by an independent action. Therefore, the 
rule permits the filing of an independent 
action. 
However, a question arises as to the scope of 
using independent actions to obtain relief 
from a judgment. It appears that plaintiff 
takes the position that an independent action 
may be used to challenge any judgments. 
However, Utah case law and federal case law 
interpreting Rule 60 seem to indicate that 
independent actions may only be used to 
challenge certain judgments. 
21. Judge Ballif goes on to state that Century 21 has 
failed to state "the equitable grounds" required for maintaining 
an independent action for relief from Judgment. No such 
requirement is set out in the Utah Rule 60 U.R.C.P.. Judge 
Ballif obtained that requirement by examining the case entitled 
Bankers Mortg. Co. v. U.S., 423 F.2d 73 (C.A. Tex. 1970), Cert. 
Den. 90 S.Ct. 2242 (1970). Furthermore, Judge Ballif concluded 
that the Plaintiff had not shown any equitable considerations to 
justify filing this independent action. With this position, 
Century 21 takes exception. Century 21 clearly showed to the 
trial court (Judge Ballif) that the original trial judge in the 
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first action considered the merits of the various parties' 
positions and considered all of the equitable arguments involved 
and entered a ruling denying relief to Security Title against 
Century 21. From an examination of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Judge 
Sam's March 31, 1986 ruling (see Exhibit "A"), it is clear, that 
Judge Sam considered both the legal arguments and positions as 
well as equitable considerations concerning the parties and 
allowed equity to overcome the result which may have otherwise 
legally obtained. The most fundamental consideration in Judge 
Sam's mind, clear from his ruling, was the fact that Security 
Title did not act in a reasonably prudent manner when it 
disbursed funds "at issue to Defendants Bontivia and Casper 
before Bontivia's check cleared the drawee bank, particularly 
where the draft involved out-of-state and foreign financial 
institutions." (See paragraph 1, Exhibit "A" and Record, page 
38.) 
22. It is well-established in Utah that a person who fails 
to act reasonably or who acts in a negligent manner (as did 
Security Title in the manner in which it disbursed funds leading 
directly to its claimed loss) should not benefit from its own 
negligence or unreasonable conduct. 
23. When the successor Judge Park reversed Judge Sam's 
ruling a year after its entry, Judge Park failed to take into 
consideration all of the facts and issues involved in the first 
cause of action and failed to examine or even consider the 
equitable arguments which led to Judge Sam's decision and instead 
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looked only at the "holder in due course status" claimed by 
Security Title, and upon that basis, without the presentation of 
any additional facts or any new evidence, simply reversed Judge 
Sam's decision. This act on the part of the predecessor Judge 
Park was illegal (meaning contrary to law)(See Exhibit "E"; 
Record p.44 lines 4-13). 
24. Therefore, this Honorable Appellate Court should find 
and rule that the new trial court (Judge Ballif presiding) erred 
in dismissing Century 21fs new action for relief from the second 
of two contradictory rulings entered in the previous action. 
ISSUE #4. WHETHER RULE 60(b) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE ALLOWS A PARTY AGAINST WHOM A FINAL JUDGMENT HAS BEEN 
ISSUED TO PROCEED IN THE ALTERNATIVE WITH EITHER AN APPEAL, OR BY 
INDEPENDENT ACTION? 
25. As specifically found by the new trial Judge Ballif in 
his ruling (see paragraph 4 of Exhibit "D"; Record page 60), Rule 
60(b) clearly allows a party against whom a Judgment has issued 
to proceed in the alternative with either a motion or by 
independent action. The language of the Rule is undeniably clear 
and unconditional. The position taken by Judge Ballif that an 
action for relief from Judgement may only be pursued on the 
grounds of fraud or misrepresentation is clearly contrary to the 
clear meaning of the language of Rule 60 and to the committee 
notes published in connection with that Rule. Rule 60 has seven 
(7) specified grounds for relief from Judgement and one (1) 
unnumbered ground contained in the second to the last sentence of 
Rule 60 (b). That sentence reads as follows: 
The Rule does not limit the power of a court 
to entertain an independent action to relieve 
a party from a judgment, order or proceeding 
or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the 
court. 
26. There are six (6) other bases contained in the Rule 
other than fraud, for which a party may seekk relief from a 
Judgment. Therefore, it is clear from an analysis and reading of 
Rule 60(b) that six of the eight grounds listed therein are for 
reasons other than fraud. It is illogical and insupportable for 
the Trial Court to take the position that all relief under Rule 
60(b), if pursued by an independent action, must be based on only 
two of the eight enumerated grounds set forth in the Rule. 
27. Furthermore, Rule 1(a) U.R.C.P. states categorically and 
clearly: 
They (meaning the Rules of Procedure) shall 
be liberally construed to secure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of 
every action. [Emphasis or clarification 
added] 
28. A further point in support of Century 21* s position is 
the last sentence of Rule 60(b) which states: 
The procedure for obtaining any relief from a 
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in 
these rules or by an independent action. 
29. The last sentence of Rule 60(b) U.R.C.P. states clearly 
and undeniably that an independent action may be pursued based 
upon any of the grounds for relief set forth in this Rule. That 
means the relief can be based on any of the eight enumerated 
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grounds and is not limited to ground No. 3 or the eighth 
unnumbered, but enumerated, ground of fraud. 
30. Further, a persuasive argument can be made by quoting 
from the Advisory Committee on Rules annotations published with 
Federal Rule 60(b) which Notes state as follows: 
When promulgated, the Rules contain a number 
of provisions, including those found in Rule 
60(b), describing the practice by a motion to 
obtain relief from judgments, and these Rules 
coupled with the reservation in Rule 60(b) of 
the right to entertain a new action to 
relieve a party from a judgment, were 
generally supposed to coverr the field. . . . 
If the right to make a motion is lost by the 
expiration of the time limits fixed in thee 
rules, the only other procedural remedy is by 
a new or independent action to set aside a 
judgment upon those principles which have 
heretofore been applied in such an action. 
Where the independent action is resorted to, 
the limitations of time are those of laches 
or statutes of limitations. The Committee 
has endeavored to ascertain all the remedies 
and types of relief heretofore available . . 
It endeavored then to amend the Rule to 
permit, either by motion or by independent 
action, the granting of various kinds of 
relief from judgments which were permitted in 
the Federal court prior to the adoption of 
these rules, and the Amendment concludes with 
a provision abolishing the use of Bills of 
Review . . ., and requiring the practice to 
be by Motion or by independent action. It 
should be noted that Rule 60(b) does not 
assume to define substantive lav/ as to the 
grounds for vacating judgments, but merely 
prescribes the practice in proceedings to 
obtain relief. 
3.1. The Utah Supreme Court, in the case of Shaw v. Pilcher, 
9 Utah 2d. 222, 341 P.2d 949 (Utah 1959), stated that where 
"fraud upon the Court" is the gravamen of a proceeding to relieve 
a party of the effect of a judgment, such proceeding must be 
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pursued in an independent action by filing a separate suit, and 
not by way of motion in the original action. This shows that an 
independent action is mandated and not merely permissibly allowed 
in the case of fraud. The collateral statement of that rule 
would therefore be that an independent action is not limited to 
the basis of fraud, but may be used for any of the reasons under 
Rule 60 (b). 
32. The case of St. Pierre v. Edmonds, 645 P.2d 615 (Utah 
1982), clearly stands for the proposition that an independent 
action may be filed later than three months after a judgment or 
decree has been entered for fraud or duress. The case stands for 
the further proposition that the doctrine of laches and other 
equitable principles determine the time within which the action 
must be brought, and does not limited the time period to one 
year, although Century 21 in this case did file its action within 
one year, in compliance with the generally held view and 
interpretation of the Federal Rule 60(b) which does state the 
time period. 
33. After a fairly thorough review of the annotated cases 
interpreting Rule 60 U.R.C.P., it is believed and upon belief 
asserted that there is no case in Utah which mandates the pursuit 
of an appeal after a final judgment has issued as opposed to the 
pursuit of an independent action for relief from Judgment. The 
Rule does not state that the party against whom a judgment has 
entered must proceed by appeal or by independent action, but 
rather states that relief from the Judgment may be pursued either 
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by motion or by an independent action. An appeal is not mandated 
under Rule 60(b). 
34. Therefore, this Appellate Court is urged to rule that 
Century 21 is within its legal rights in pursuing relief from an 
independent action rather than by pursuing an appeal or by filing 
a motion under Rule 60(b). 
ISSUE #5. WHETHER THE SCOPE OF USING AN INDEPENDENT ACTION TO 
OBTAIN RELIEF FROM A JUDGMENT, allowed under rule 60(B) U.R.C.P., 
IS LIMITED SUCH THAT SAID PROCEDURE CANNOT BE USED IN THIS 
INSTANT CASE, CONTRACT TO THE EXPRESS LANGUAGE OF THE RULE? 
35. The arguments set forth under Issue #4, supra, are 
incorporated under this issue as if fully set forth herein. 
36. There appears to be no case authority which clearly 
limits the scope of an independent action under Rule 60(b) for 
the pursuit of relief from a judgment. Rather, the cases seem to 
indicate that in certain instances, an independent action must be 
used, rather than a motion in the pursuit of relief from a 
judgment based upon fraud. This in no way limits the use of an 
independent action to the sole ground of fraud or 
misrepresentation. 
37. Based upon all of the authorities and arguments set 
forth in this brief, supra, it is or should be the reasoned 
conclusion of this Court that Century 21 has properly and timely 
filed an independent action for relief from the second of two 
contradictory rulings or judgments of the Fourth District Court 
entered in the First Action No. 69561. 
9fl 
SHORT CONCLUSION 
The Appellate Court, after considering all of the arguments, 
evidence, record, and briefs of the parties herein, is urged to 
conclude that a successor Judge (Judge Park in this instance) was 
acting without authority and beyond the scope of his jurisdiction 
in reversing the prior written final ruling of the original Trial 
Judge, David Sam in the first action involving these parties 
under Civil No. 69561. The facts are clear as to the formulation 
and entry of a written statement of findings and conclusion or 
Judgment by Judge David Sam without his signature and the fact 
that the successor Judge Park simply acted in entering that March 
31, 1986 ruling. Further, the Court is urged to reach the 
conclusion that the second Trial Court, Judge Ballif presiding, 
erred in dismissing Century 21fs independent action for relief 
from Judgment and should reverse and remand this matter back to 
the Trial Court for entry of a Judgment in favor of Century 21's 
position and against the position urged by Security Title. 
Last of all, this Appellate Court is urged to reach the 
conclusion that Rule 60, U.R.C.P. allows for the filing of an 
independent action under the circumstances as found in this 
instant case, where two contradictory rulings have been made in a 
previous case, one by the original trial judge based upon the 
evidence and the second by a successor Judge without the hearing, 
taking, or presentation of new or additional evidence or 
testimony and upon the same facts as existed when the original 
Trial Judge made his ruling. As part of that determination, this 
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Honorable Court is urged to find that Judge Park's signing and 
entry of Judge Sam's March 31, 1986 Minute Entry Ruling was an 
act for and in behalf of the original predecessor Trial Judge and 
was not an independent act of the successor Judge, such as would 
allow the successor Judge to later modify his own ruling, as 
would be the case under other circumstances. In short, the 
Summary Judgment Motion of the Plaintiff Century 21 should be 
granted and the Trial Court's ruling granting the Defendant 
Security Title's Motion to Dismiss should be reversed and 
remanded for Entry of Judgment in accordance with this Court's 
opinion. 
lis **( DATED thi  /> ( day of April, 1989. 
ARkON F. JEPSO 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Century 21 
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APR. 4\9&S 
In the Fourth Judicial District Court* ° c n G £ 
of the State of Utah 
In and For Utah County 
SECURITY T ITLE AND ABSTRACT 
COMPANY, 
FUfattff 
DICK CASPER, CARLO BONTIV1A AND/ 
CENTURY 21 GOLDEN WEST I N C . , 
Dcfc&dint 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 69,561 
DATED March 31, 198-6 
Boyd Park JUDGE 
This case is befojhe the court on Motions for Summary Judgment 
of plaintiff and defendant Casper and is considered pursuant to 
Rule 2,8, Rules of Practice of the District Courts. 
R U L I N G 
Upon review of the memoranda and documents on file, the 
court finds the present facts are undisputed. The issues of law 
shall be decided as follows: 
1. Plaintiff is entitled to restitution from defendant Casper 
in the amount of $40,000 subject to a set-off in the amount of 
damages defendant Casper suffers through his efforts to pay 
restitution. The court notes defendant Casper relied to his 
detriment on the propriety of plaintiff's disbursement of escrow 
when Casper used the funds to pay various creditors. Nevertheless, 
the court grants plaintiff's request for restitution in order to 
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avoid unjust enrichment of defendant Casper where he has both 
retained the ownership of his property and enjoyed use of the 
disbursed funds. However, the court is persuaded plaintiff did 
not act in a reasonably prudent manner when it disbursed the funds 
at issue to defendants Bontivia and Casper before Bontivia's check 
cleared tne drawee bank, particularly where the draft involved 
out-of-state and foreign financial institutions. For this reason, 
the court further rules that plaintiff is not entitled to full 
protection of the idesnnification clauses contained in Exhibits 
2-4 and that its relief is limited to the above-stated restitution 
less any damages defendant Casper can prove at hearing. 
r 2. The court recognized plaintiff's holder in due course status 
I as to its claim against defendant Century 21 for reimbursement on the 
/P $5,000.00 dishonored check tendered to plaintiff as an escrow fee. 
/ However, upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances 
\ surrounding the failure of escrow to close properly, the court hereby 
\ rules that plaintiff's recovery against defendant Century 
I 21 is limited to the value of its actual services rendered, not 
^ i n c l u d i n g its actions taken after disbursement of escrow funds. 
3. Crossclaim defendant Casper's Motion for Summary Judgment 
against Crossclaim plaintiff Century 21's claim for a broker's fee 
is granted. It appears to the court that Century 21 is not entitled 
to a broker's fee in light of the fraudulent circumstances under 
which the buyer, defendant Bontivia, entered the escrow agreement. 
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Accordingly, the Motions for Summary Judgment of plaintiff and 
defendant Casper are granted in part and denied in part as per the 
above Ruling. All parties are to bear their own costs. Issues 
of defendant Casper's alleged damages and plaintiff's entitlement 
to an escrow fee will be heard on application by any party hereto 
and proper notice being given. 
Dated this ^Z day of /j?o^£> 1986. 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
cc: Anron F. Jepson 
Robert L. Moody 
Michael J. Petro 
TabB 
- — >*f' 
Robert L. Moody, #2302 
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
55 East Center Street 
P.O. Box 1466 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone 801-373-2721 
OCT 2-: 1986 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH (RUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SECURITY TITLE AND ABSTRACT 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DICK CASPER, CARLO BONTIVIA 
and CENTURTY 21 GOLDEN VvEST 
INC., 
Defendants. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 69,561 
The above e n t i t l e d matter having come on r e g u l a r l y for 
h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e Court on P l a i n t i f f ' s Mot ion f o r Summary 
Judgment and the Court having made i t s Rul ing pursuant to Rule 
2 . 8 and be ing f u l l y adv i sed in the premises ; 
NOw HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as f o l l o w s : 
1. P l a i n t i f f i s h e r e b y awarded judgment a g a i n s t t h e 
Defendant Dick Casper in the sum of FORTY THOUSAND ($40,000.00) 
DOLLARS t o g e t h e r w i t h i n t e r e s t a t t h e r a t e o f 10% from t h e 22nd 
day o f March, 1985 t o t h e d a t e o f t h i s judgment and 12% 
1 
therafter until paid. 
2. Defendant Casper shall have the right to present 
evidence with regard to any detriment he may have suffered in 
using the funds to pay his various creditors. 
3. Plaintifffs cause of action with regard to 
indemnification is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
4. Plaintiff is hereby awarded judgment against the 
Defendant Century 21 Golden Uest Inc. in the amount of FIVE 
THOUSAND ($5,000.00) DOLLARS together with interest at the 
rate of 10% from the 22nd day of March, 1985 to the date of 
this judgment and 12% thereafter. 
5.i Plaintiffs claim with regard to indemnity against 
Defendant Century 21 Golden hest Inc. is hereby dismissed with 
prejudice. 
6. The cross-claim of Century 21 Golden Vjest Inc. 
against the Defendant Dick Casper for brokerage fee is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice. 
7. Each of the parties is hereby ordered to pay their 
own costs. 
8. Further issues will be heard upon application and 
proper notice. 
2 
DATED this day of , 1986. 
BOYD L. PARK 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing SUMMARY JUDGMENT to Arron F. Jeppson, Esq., 8 
East 300 South Judge Building, Suite 510, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111 and Mr. Michael J. Petro, Esq., P.O. Box "L", Provo, Utah 
84603; postage prepaid this pjb' day of (<l\ , 
1 9 8 6 . 
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Robert L. Moody, #2302 
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
55 East Center Street 
P.O. Box 1466 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone 801-373-2721 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SECURITY TITLE & ABSTRACT 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DICK CASPER, CARLO BONTIVIA, 
and CENTURY 21 GOLDEN WEST, 
INC., 
Defendants. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 69,561 
The above e n t i t l e d matter having come on r e g u l a r l y for 
h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e Court on P l a i n t i f f ' s Mot ion f o r Summary 
Judgment . The Court h a v i n g made a r u l i n g b e a r i n g t h e d a t e o f 
March 31 , 1986 and a proposed Judgment was submit ted pursuant t o 
s a i d R u l i n g d a t e d March 3 1 , 1 9 8 6 , but o b j e c t i o n s t o s a i d 
proposed Summary Judgment having been f i l e d w i t h the Court. A 
hearing was held for the above e n t i t l e d Court on s a i d o b j e c t i o n s 
and proposed Summary Judgment on February 20, 1987 at which t ime 
P l a i n t i f f appeared in p e r s o n and by and t h r o u g h t h e i r c o u n s e l , 
1 
Thomas S. Taylor; Defendant Capser appeared through his 
attorney, Michael J. Petro; Defendant Century 21 Golden West, 
Inc., appeared through their counsel, Arron F. Jepson; and no 
one appearing for and on behalf of Defendant Bontivia. The 
Court having heard the arguments of counsel, a review and 
examination of the facts having been made and the Court being 
fully advised, made and has entered an Amended Ruling of the 
Court. Pursuant to said Amended Ruling, on file herein, the 
Court 
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as f o l l o w s : 
1 • P l a i n t i f f i s h e r e b y a w a r d e d J u d g m e n t a g a i n s t 
Defendant Dick Casper in t h e sum of FORTY THOUSAND ($40,000.00) 
DOLLARS, t o g e t h e r w i t h i n t e r e s t a t t h e r a t e of t en p e r c e n t (10%) 
from t h e 22nd day of M a r c h , 1985 t o t h e d a t e of t h i s J u d g m e n t 
and t w e l v e p e r c e n t (12%) t h e r e a f t e r u n t i l p a i d . D e f e n d a n t 
C a s p e r i s h e r e b y o r d e r e d n o t t o e n c u a i b e r , s a l e o r t r a n s f e r t h e 
r e a l p r o p e r t y he p u r p o r t e d l y s o l d t o D e f e n d a n t B o n t i v i a u n t i l 
t h e f i n a l n e t judgment h e r e i n d e s c r i b e d , a f t e r t h e s e t - o f f has 
been d e t e r m i n e d and r u l e d u p o n . The r e a l p r o p e r t y in q u e s t i o n 
b e i n g d e s c r i b e d as f o l l o w s : 
Lot 18, P l a t "A", Ho l iday H i l l s P lanned D w e l l i n g 
G r o u p , U tah C o u n t y , S t a t e of U t a h , a c c o r d i n g t o 
t h e o f f i c i a l p l a t t h e r e o f on f i l e i n t h e o f f i c e 
of t h e Reco rde r of Utah County, S t a t e of Utah . 
2 . D e f e n d a n t C a s p e r s h a l l s u b m i t t o P l a i n t i f f any 
2 
e v i d e n c e t h a t he may have w i t h r e g a r d t o h i s c l a i m e d s e t - o f f 
r e l a t i n g t o h i s damages c l a i m e d and r e l a t e d to t h e payment of 
h i s va r ious c r e d i t o r s from the funds he rece ived wi th in s i x t y 
(60) days from t h e e n t r y h e r e o f . In t h e e v e n t t h e p a r t i e s do 
n o t s t i p u l a t e and a g r e e as t o s a i d a m o u n t , a p p r o p r i a t e 
Memorandums and Evidence s h a l l be submit ted in w r i t t e n form to 
t h i s Court to be ruled upon pursuant to Rule 2.8. At t h a t t ime 
the Court s h a l l determine what i f any amount Defendant Casper 
i s e n t i t l e d to as a c r e d i t upon the FORTY THOUSAND (540,000.00) 
DOLLAR judgment awarded P l a i n t i f f a g a i n s t Defendant Casper and 
as h e r e i n d e s c r i b e d . In t h e even t t h e Defendant f a i l s t o 
submit evidence to P l a i n t i f f wi th in s i x t y (60) days from en t ry 
he reof , P l a i n t i f f s h a l l be e n t i t l e d to e x e c u t i o n on i t s 
judgment. 
3. By reason of P l a i n t i f f ' s Judgment aga ins t Defendant 
C a s p e r , P l a i n t i f f ' s c a u s e of a c t i o n w i t h r e g a r d t o 
i n d e m n i f i c a t i o n a g a i n s t Defendant Casper i s he reby d i s m i s s e d 
with p r e j u d i c e . 
4 . P l a i n t i f f i s h e r e b y a w a r d e d J u d g m e n t a g a i n s t 
Defendant Cen tu ry 21 Golden West, I n c . , in t h e amount of FIVE 
THOUSAND ($5,000.00) DOLLARS. P l a i n t i f f i s he reby s t a y e d from 
execut ing upon t h i s judgment u n t i l February 20, 1988, a t which 
time t h i s s tay aga ins t execut ion s h a l l be removed. P l a i n t i f f i s 
3 
noc e n t i t l e d to i n t e r e s t on s a i d FIVE THOUSAND ($5 ,000 .00) 
DOLLAR judgment h e r e i n d e s c r i b e d and no i n t e r e s t s h a l l be 
a t t ached t h e r e t o u n t i l February 28, 1988, a t which t ime i n t e r e s t 
s h a l l commence upon sa id judgment a t the r a t e of twelve percent 
(12%) per annum. 
5. P l a i n t i f f ' s c l a im w i t h r e g a r d t o indemni fy a g a i n s t 
Defendant Century 21 Golden West, Inc . , i s hereby d ismissed wi th 
p r e j u d i c e . 
6. The C r o s s - c l a i m of Century 21 Golden West , I n c . , 
a g a i n s t Defendant Dick Casper fo r b r o k e r a g e f e e s i s he reby 
dismissed with p r e j u d i c e . 
7. Each of t h e p a r t i e s i s he reby o r d e r e d to pay t h e i r 
own c o s t s , fees and expenses . 
8. F u r t h e r i s s u e s w i l l be heard upon a p p l i c a t i o n and 
proper n o t i c e . 
Li *- > / 
DATED this / day of //!J .' r( N , 1987. 
K/ __ 
B0YD"Lr"PARK7"DlSTRICf"JUDGE"" 
» 
I 
4 
CERIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the JZJJ^AJ day of February, 
1987, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, postage prepaid to the following: 
Arron F. Jepson 
8 East 300 South 
Judge Building, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Michael J. Petro 
P.O. Box "L" 
Provo, Utah 84603 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
• • • • • • • • A * 
CENTURY 21 GOLDEN WEST, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
SECURITY TITLE AND ABSTRACT 
COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
CASE NUMBER: CV 88-416 
RULING 
********** 
This matter is before the court on defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss plaintiff's complaint. Both parties have filed memorandum 
of points and authorities in support of their positions. In 
addition, plaintiff hasklso filed a motion for summary judgment. 
The court having carefully considered the motions and the 
accompanying memo now enters its: 
RULJNG 
The present action arises from a prior action between 
the present parties. In that action, assigned to Judge Sam, 
plaintiff here was the defendant and the defendant here was the 
plaintiff. Plaintiff there filed a motion for summary judgment 
which was reviewed and considered by judge Sam. A ruling was then 
diafted; however, before judge Sam siqned the ruling, he left to 
take up a federal judgeship with the federal district court. 
Judge Park, Sam's successor then signed judge Sam's ruling. 
Objections were made to the ruling, and after oral arguments, 
judge Park rendered an ammended ruling; pursuant to that ruling a 
judgment was entered. Plaintiff here did not appeal, instead it 
filed a new action for relief from the judgment entered by judge 
Park. The gist of plaintiff's action here is that judge Park's 
order amending judge Sam's prior ruling is null and void, and 
has no effect,because judge Park was without authority to amend 
judge Sam's prior ruling. 
Defendant's motion to dismiss is based on the grounds 
that the prior action between the two parties is res judicata as 
to the present action, and plaintiff's appropriate remedy is an 
appeal? not the commencement of a new action. 
Addressing these two grounds, Rule 60 of the rules of 
civil procedure provides that the procedure for obtaining relief 
form a judgment shall be by motion or by an independent action. 
Therefore the rule permits the filing of an independent action. 
However a question arises as to the scope of using independent 
actions to obtain relief from a judgment, it appears that 
plaintiff takes the position that an independent action may be 
used to challenge any judgments. However, Utah case law and 
federal case law interpreting Rule 60 seem to indicate that 
independent actions may only be used to challenge certain 
judgments. 
The cases that have allowed a party to file an 
independent action are cases where the judgments were procured by 
fraud. In the Utah case of Despain v. Despain, 682 P.2d 849 (Utah 
]9R4), the court allowed an independent action to be filed on the 
ground of fraud. Jjji. at 452-453. In Bankers Mortg. Co. v. U. S.f 
423 F.2d 73 (C.A. Tex. 1970), cert, denied, 90 S.Ct. 2242 (1970), 
the court enunciated the elements of the independent action. 
These are the elements: (1) a judgment which ought not, 
in equity and good conscience, be enforced; (2) a good defense to 
the alleged cause of action on which the judgment is founded; (3) 
fraud, accident or mistake which prevented the defendant from 
obtaining the benefit of his defense; (4) the absence of fault or 
negLigence on the part of defendant; and (5) the absence of any 
adequate remedy at Jaw. [n affirming the district court's 
dismissal of the independent action, the court of appeal held 
Min the instant case taxpayer never intimates that mistake, 
accident or fraud prevented its presentation of a meritorious 
defense in the original proceeding. Similarly, we are totally 
unable to understand why equitable considerations require that 
the effect of the judgment be compromised." !_d. 
Here, plaintiff has not alleged any of the equitable 
grounds required for maintaining an independent action. Second, 
an independent action may be maintained only if there Ls no 
adequate remedy at law. Here, the remedy of appeal was available 
t<~> plaintiff, and it had ample time to file an appeal. It chose 
n<>t to exercise that right. Since an independent action is in 
equity, it should be granted only if equitable considerations 
require that the prior judgment be vacated. Plaintiff here has 
not shown any equitable considerations to justify filing this 
independent action to obtain relief form the prior judgment. 
Based on the foregoing analysis the defendant's motion 
to Dismiss is hereby granted, and plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment is denied. 
DATED, in Provo, Utah this /<7 day of July, 1988. 
GEORGE ~£L BALLIFT" JUDGfe. 
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SECURITY TITLE AND 
A3 5 TPui T T C DtiPjJsY 
Plaintiff, 
) 
Civil No. 69,561 
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16 I BE IT REMEMBERED that on Friday the 20th day of 
17 | February, 1987, the HEARING in the above entitled matter 
18 |was taken by Richard C. Tatton, a Certified Shorthand 
)9 I Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah 
20 before the Honorable Boyd L. Park at the Utah County Courthou 
21 Provo, Utah 84601 
DICK CASPER ET AL 
Defendants 
) 
pe 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the Plaintiff: Mr. Tom Taylor 
Attorney at Law 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorney at Law 
Provo, Utah 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
8 I For the Defendant 
Century 21 Golden 
9 ]West Inc.: Mr. Aaron Jepson 
Attorney at Law 
10 | Salt Lake City, Utah 
11 
12 
13 (For the Defendant 
Dick Casper: Mr. Mike Petro 
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17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
THE COURT: Okay we are here this morning on 
Security Title and Abstract Company plaintiff vs. Dick 
Casper Et Al, defendants and there were some cross claims 
or whatever this is something that became before Judge 
Sam. Judge Sam had actually written the ruling in this 
matter but he had not signed it before he was elevated to 
the Federal Bench. I reviewed the file, reviewed his 
Judgment and I felt that it was fair under the circumstances 
1 THE COURT: I understand what you are saying. I 
2 think this is why Judge Sam did what he did. 
j MR. JEPSON: Right. 
4 THE COURT: And I simply just signed his Judgment 
5 for him since he was gone and he had already rendered it. 
6 I don t think I believe Judge S am. I think I am more bound 
7 by the rules of evidence and the rules of law construction 
8 I just can't reach out here and - -
9 MR. JEPSON: But the claim here is in an equitable 
10 setting and certainly equity can say we have two victims 
11 and they were both defrauded by the same chain of events 
12 we will make the one victim make the second victim whole. 
13 That certainly cannot be equitable. 
14 THE COURT: Yes I can maybe not in the opinion 
15 of your client may not be equitable but I think your 
16 client may have some remedy with the $5,000.00 against 
17 the bank and maybe against Mr. Bontivia. 
18 I MR. JEPSON: If the court were to find to amend the 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
previous ruling and I am hoping and urging that you don't 
do that but if you do then what I would suggest and this 
may be an unusual approach but I would suggest that if you 
were inclined to enter any kind of a Judgment whether it is 
for the $5,000.00 or some lesser amount, would it be 
possible to enter the Judgment with the payment liability 
or enter an order that he is responsible to reimburse Securi FY 
27 
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ARRON F. JEPSON, #1698 
Attorney for Century 21 Golden West, Inc. 
No. 8 East 300 South 
Judge Building, No. 608 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2202 
Telephone: (801) 364-9100 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Civil No. CV-88-416 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOOoo 
CENTURY 21 GOLDEN WEST, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SECURITY TITLE AND ABSTRACT 
COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
oooOOoo 
COMES NOW the plaintiff, CENTURY 21 GOLDEN WEST, INC., (hereafter 
called "Century 21", or "plaintiff"), by and through its attorney, ARRON F. 
JEPSON, and for causes of action against the defendant alleges as follows: 
1. Plaintiff is a Utah corporation with its principal place of 
business in Utah County, State of Utah. 
2. Defendant is a title and abstract company doing business in 
Utah County. 
3. Venue is proper in Utah County. 
4. On or about May 10, 1985, a civil action was filed in the 
Fourth Judicial District Court under Civil No. 69561, in which the 
defendant was the plaintiff and in which the plaintiff herein was named 
as a co-defendant. In that action and after the filing of the Complaint, 
a motion for summary judgment was filed by SECURITY TITLE AND ABSTRACT 
COMPANY, on or about August 29, 1985. (This previous action, No. 69561, 
shall hereafter be called or referred to as, "previous action", or 
"original action")• 
5. After the submission of all pleadings and replies with regard 
to SECURITY TITLE AND ABSTRACT COMPANY'S (hereafter called "Security Title") 
motion for summary judgment, Judge Sam, the then judge assigned to the case, 
examined all of the evidence and the pleadings and drafted a minute entry 
in that original action dated Marfch 31, 1986. 
6. Prior to the execution of the minute entry ruling on Security 
Title's summary judgment motion in the original action, Judge Sam left 
the State bench and assumed new responsibilities as a Judge on the 
Federal bench in Salt Lake City. Judge Sam never signed the minute entry 
ruling (hereafter called, "Judge Sam's ruling or order"), which he had 
prepared after reviewing the evidence submitted in support and in opposition 
of Security Title's summary judgment motion. 
7. Judge Boyd Park assumed the State Court bench in place 
of Judge Sam, und thereafter signed Judge Sam's ruling or order and placed 
his name thereon under date of March 3X» 1986. 
H. In paragraph 2 of Judge Sam's order, the Court ruled as 
follows regarding Century 21: 
However, upon consideration of the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the failure of escrow 
to close properly, the Court hereby rules that plaintiff's 
recovery against defendant Century 21 is limited to the 
value of its actual services rendered, not including its 
actions taken after disbursement of escrow funds. 
-2-
9. Judge Sam's ruling was an effective, entered order of the 
Court, pursuant to Rule 7(b)(2), of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
states: 
An order includes every direction of the court 
including a minute order made and entered in 
writing and not included in a judgment. 
10. On October 22, 1986, a copy of a proposed summary judgment 
prepared by Security Title's attorney, ROBERT MOODY, was received in 
Century 21 counsel's office in Salt Lake City, Utah. Century 21, through 
its counsel, filed objections to Security Title's proposed judgment because 
paragraph 4 of said proposed judgment was just the opposite of Judge Sam's 
ruling. 
11. The matter was set for oral argument by the Court on February 20, 
1987, at 11:00 a.m., before the Honorable Boyd L. Park. Mr. Thomas Taylor 
appeared in behalf of Robert Moody for Security Title, and Arron F. Jepson 
appeared in behalf of Century 21. There was no new evidence presented 
to the Court at this 1987 hearing. Judge Park indicated (and the plaintiff 
herein believes that such is on a court record which can be transcribed 
hereafter) that the Court (meaning Judge Park), had assumed the bench 
after Judge Sam's ruling had been prepared, and simply executed the ruling 
and entered it in the record. The Court (meaning Judge Park), at the 
February 20, 1987 hearing, after hearing arguments of counsel, but without 
either viewing the evidence or receiving any new or contrary evidence, 
reversed the ruling prepared by Judge Sam which he himself (Judge Park) 
had signed, and ordered that judgment enter against Century 21 and in 
-3-
favor of Security Title in the amount of $5,000.00. 
12. Judge Park signed and entered a Summary Judgment prepared by 
Security Title's attorney, Robert Moody,i which judgment was signed and entered 
in the Register of Actions on March 4, 1987. 
13. There is no minute entry or order in the Court vacating the 
previous order. There now exist two (2) contradictory judgments or orders of 
the court with respect to the liability of Century 21 toward Security Title. 
14. Century 21 alleges that it is entitled to relief from the 
second judgment entitled, "Summary Judgment" entered on or about March 4, 1987, 
under the signature of Judge Park, and is entitled to the legal effect and 
consequences of Judge Sam's earlier ruling and order on the summary judgment 
motion of Security Title. Furthermore, plaintiff herein, (Century 21), alleges 
that the second order of Judge Park was illegally entered (meaning contrary 
to law) and is null and void and of no effect and is entitled to judgment in 
this action in accordance therewith. 
WHEREFORE plaintiff prays for judgment against the defendant as 
follows: 
1. For an order or judgment of this court relieving the plaintiff 
from the effects of the March 4, 1987 "Summary Judgment" entered under the 
signature of Judge Park. 
2. For reinstatement or reaffirmation of the judgment or ruling of 
Judge Sam as contained in the March 31, 1986 minute entry prepared by Judge Sam 
and executed by Judge Boyd Park. 
3. For such other and further relief, including equitable relief, as 
-4-
is just in the premises. 
DATED this /S~ day of March, J988, 
CENTURY 21 GOLDEN WEST, INC., a Utah 
corpora t ion 
BY: VSf-.( \-\\Y>„, r^^-r* 
MARK HA^ HAWA'Y, Pres iden t 
*~V\ 
ARRON F. JEPSON 
Attorney for Plafjrtfiff 
- 5 -
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
MARK HATHAWAY, as president of CENTURY 21 GOLDEN WEST, INC., 
being duly sworn deposes and says: 
That he is the president of the above-named corporation which is 
the plaintiff in the above-entitled action; that he has read the foregoing 
Complaint and knows the contents thereof; that the same are true of his 
own knowledge, except as to those matters that are therein stated on his 
information or belief, and, as to those matters, he believes them to be 
true. 
CENTURY 21 GOLDEN WEST, INC. 
BY:\\ 
RKH 
X-VN l Ac* /^v. (X- ^-^>S^~-\ 
MARK ATHAWAY, President' 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this //'>- day of March, 1988. 
,L< OS v — k ( 0-'hs. a. 
NOTARY PUBLIC , 
Residing at: J' 
My Commissi on Expires: 
*7 
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TIME LINE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 
May 10, 1985 
August 29, 1985 
Prior to 
March 31, 1986 
March, 1986 
March 31, 1986 
October 22, 1986 
February 20, 1987 
March 4, 1987 
March 3, 1988 
Complaint filed 1st Action # 69561 
Security Title filed Summary 
Judgment Motion asking for $5,000 
judgment against Century 21 
Minute Entry Ruling prepared by 
Trial Judge David Sam denying 
$5,000 judgment against Century 21 
Judge Park appointed as Successor 
Judge to replace vacancy left by 
Judge Sam 
Judge Park signed and entered Judge 
Sam's Minute Entry Ruling 
Proposed Summary Judgment prepared 
and delivered by Security Title's 
attorney to Century 21fs attorney 
Objection to Proposed Summary 
Judgment filed 
Hearing on Century 21fs Objection 
to Proposed Summary Judgment set 
and held 
New judgment entered for $5,000 
(opposite of Judge Sam's Ruling 
denying the $5,000) 
New action for relief from Judgment 
filed by Century 21 CV. 88416 
TabH 
PART I 
Scope of Rules—One Form of Action 
Rule 1. Genera! Provisions 
(a) Scope of Rules. These rules shall govern the procedure in 
the Supreme Court, the districts courts, city courts, and justice 
courts of the state of Utah, in all actions, suits and proceedings 
of a civil nature, whether cognizable at law or in equity, and in 
all special statutory proceedings, except as stated in Rule 81. 
They shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action. 
(b) Effective Date. These rules shall take effect on January 1, 
1950; and thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no 
further force or effect. They govern all proceedings in actions 
brought after they take effect and also all further proceedings in 
actions then pending, except to the extent that in the opinion of 
the court their application in a particular action pending when 
the rules take effect would not be feasible or would work in-
justice, in which event the former procedure applies. 
Rule 2. One Form of Action 
There shall be one form of action to be known as "civil ac-
tion." 
1 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall simi-
larly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of 
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given 
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court follow-
ing the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb). The 
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its 
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56- and 59 
when the motion is based on more than one ground. ' 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after 
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional find-
ings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with 
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made 
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not 
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to 
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judg-
ment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of f indings of fact a n d conclus ions of law. Except in actions 
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the 
parties to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
(Amended, effective Jan . 1, 1987.) 
Rule 60 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
tions in civil case as affected by the manner in Amendment, after expiration of time for fij. 
which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d 501. ing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion 
Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845. 
jury in civil case of scene of accident or prem- Authority of state court to order jury trial in 
ises in question, 11 A.L.R.3d 918. civil case where jury has been waived or not 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of reference demanded by parties, 9 A.L.R.4th 1041. 
by counsel in civil case to result of former trial Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching 
of same case, or amount of verdict therein, 15 verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on 
A.L.R.3d 1101. appeal, 38 A.L.R.4th 1170. 
Absence of judge from courtoom during trial Jury trial waiver as binding on later state 
of civil case, 25 A.L.R.3d 637. civil trial, 48 A.L.R.4th 747. 
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of Court reporter's death or disability prior to 
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in transcribing notes as grounds for reversal or 
case, or with partner or associate of such attor- new trial, 57 A.L.R.4th 1049. 
ney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64 Key Number*. — New Trial *=» 13 et aeq 
A.L.R.3d 126. 110, 116. 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order, 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other 
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may 
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the per-
dency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evi-
dence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrin-
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has 
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has 
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to enter-
tain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or pro-
ceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these 
rules or by an independent action. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is patterned Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion 
after, and similar to, Rule 60, F.R.C.P. to set aside judgment, § 2X-2-2. 
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Injunctive relief pending appeal. 
Motion for injunction to restrain dissipation 
of marital assets during the pendency of the 
appeal of the divorce action should be filed 
with the district court; any jurisdiction that 
the Supreme Court may have in such matters 
should be invoked only after a party has 
sought relief in the district court, in all but the 
most exceptional circumstances. Warren v. 
Warren, 642 P.2d 385 (Utah 1982). 
Stay to prevent injustice. 
Equitable relief from the enforcement of a 
judgment is not granted on the ground that the 
parties have cross demands, merely, but rather 
that some injustice would result were execu-
tion not stayed. Palmquist v. Palmquist, 6 
Utah 2d 294, 312 P.2d 779 (1957). 
Where there was a judgment against hus-
band under a divorce decree, it was improper to 
enter a stay of execution in order to give hu 
band an opportunity to start an action ngair* 
wife which was based on an independent trarv 
action between the parties, and where th?i 
was no showing that some injustice to the hut 
band would otherwise result. Palmcuist t 
Palmquist, 6 Utah 2d 294, 312 P.2d 779 < 195; 
Temporary nature of stay. 
A court granting a judgment, in its disci* 
tion, may temporarily stay execution in ordt-
to prevent injustice, but it may not negate >•> 
own judgment by indefinitely staying exer-
tion thereon. Taylor Nat'l, Inc. v. Jensen Brw 
Constr, Co., 641 P.2d 150 (Utah 1982X 
Cited in Monter v. Kratzers Specialty Bree* 
Co., 29 Utah 2d 18, 504 P.2d 40 (1972 
Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987 
Jensen v. Schwendiman, 69 Utah Adv. Rep. 4J 
(Ct. App. 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 30 Am. Jur. 2d Executions 
§§ 42, 692 to 710; 46 Am. Jur. 2d 1031 to 1043, 
Judgments §§ 897 to 914. 
C.J.S. — 33 C.J.S. Executions §§ 66, 139 to 
164; 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 585 to 591. 
A.L.R. — Appealability of order staying, or 
refusing to stay, action because of pendency of 
another action, 18 A.L.R.3d 400. 
Validity and construction of state statutory 
provision forbidding court to stay, pending re-
view, judgment or order revoking or suspend 
ing professional, trade, or occupational licen* 
42 A.L.R.4th 516. 
Constitutionality, construction, and applies, 
tton of statute as to effect of taking appeal, Q. 
staying execution, on right to redeem from ext 
culion or judicial sale, 44 A.L.R.4th 1229. 
Key Numbers. — Execution «» 75, 158 t 
177; Judgment «=» 851 to 856. 
Rule 63. Disability or disqualification of a judge. 
(a) Disability. If by reason of death, sickness, or other disability, a judge 
before whom an action has been tried is unable to perform the duties to be 
performed by the court under these rules after a verdict is returned or find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law are filed, then any other judge regularly 
sitting in or assigned to the court in which the action was tried may perform 
those duties; but if such other judge is satisfied that he cannot perform those 
duties because he did not preside at the trial or for any other reason, he may 
in his discretion grant a new trial. 
(b) Disqualification. Whenever a party to any action or proceeding, civil 
or criminal, or his attorney shall make and file an affidavit that the judge 
before whom such action or proceeding is to be tried or heard has a bias or 
prejudice, either against such party or his attorney or in favor of any opposite 
party to the suit, such judge shall proceed no further therein, except to call in 
another judge to hear and determine the matter. 
Every such affidavit shall state tho facts and the reasons for the belief that 
such bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed as soon as practicable after the 
case has been assigned or such bias or prejudice is known. If the judge against 
whom the affidavit is directed questions the sufficiency of the affidavit, he 
shall enter an order directing that a copy thereof be forthwith certified to 
another judge (naming him) of the same court or of a court of like jurisdiction, 
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material facts as to which movant contends no genuine issue exists. The 
facts shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall refer with 
particularity to those portions of the record upon which movant relies. 
(e) The points and authorities in opposition to a motion for summary 
judgment shall begin with a section that contains a concise statement of 
material facts as to which the party contends a genuine issue exists. Each 
fact in dispute shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall 
refer with particularity to those portions of the record upon which the 
opposing parry relies, and, if applicable, shall state the numbered 
sentence or sentences of the movant's facts that are disputed. All material 
facts set forth in the statement of the movant shall be deemed admitted 
for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by 
the statement of the opposing party. 
(f) Decision shall be rendered without a hearing unless requested by 
the court, in which event the clerk shall set a date and time for such 
hearing. 
(g) In all cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the 
action or any issues thereof on the merits with prejudice, the party 
resisting the motion may request a hearing and such request shall be 
granted unless the motion is summarily denied. If no such request is 
made within ten (10) days of Notice to Submit for decision, a hearing on 
the motion shall be deemed waived. 
(h) Provided, however, that any district court and any circuit court bv 
order of the judge or judges of the court may exclude that court from the 
operation of this Rule 2.8 in which case an alternative procedure shall be 
prescribed by written administrative order or rule. 
Rule 2.9 Written Orders, Judgments, and Decrees 
(a) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or parties obtaining 
the ruling shall within fifteen (15) days, or within shorter time as the court 
may direct, file with the court a proposed order, judgment or decree in 
conformity with the ruling. 
(b) Copies of the proposed Findings, Judgments, and/or Orders shall 
be served on opposing counsel before being presented to the court for 
signature unless the court otherwise orders. Notice of objections thereto 
shall be submitted to the court and counsel within (5) days after service. 
(c) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall be reduced to writing 
and presented to the court for signature within fifteen (15) days of the 
settlement and dismissal. 
-6-
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Rule 59 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Cas. 1912D, 588 (sustaining and recommending the prac-
tice and citing federal cases and cases in accord from 
about sixteen states and contra from three States). The 
procedure in several States provides specifically for partial 
new trials. Ariz.Rev.Code Ann., Struckmeyer, 1928, 
§ 3852; Calif.Code Civ.Proc., Deering, 1937, §§ 657, 662; 
Smith-Hurd Ill.Stats., 1937, c. 110, § 216 (Par. (f)); Md. 
Ann.Code, Bagby, 1924, Art. 5, §§ 25, 26; Mich.Court 
Rules Ann., Searl, 1933, Rule 47, § 2; Miss.Sup.Ct.Rule 12, 
161 Miss. 903, 905, 1931; N.J.Sup.Ct.Rules 131, 132, 147, 2 
NJ.Misc. 1197, 1246-1251, 1255, 1924; 2 N.D.Comp.Laws 
Ann., 1913, § 7844, as amended by N.D.Laws 1927, ch. 214. 
1946 AMENDMENT 
Note to Subdivision (b). With the time for appeal to a 
circuit court of appeals reduced in general to 30 days by 
the proposed amendment of Rule 73(a), the utility of the 
original "except" clause, which permits a motion for a new 
trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence to be 
made before the expiration of the time for apj>eal, would 
have been seriously restricted. It was thought advisable, 
therefore, to take care of this matter in another way. By 
amendment of Rule 60(b), newly discovered evidence is 
made the basis for relief from a judgment, and the maxi-
mum time limit has been extended to one year. Accord-
ingly the amendment of Rule 59(b) eliminates the "ex-
cept" clause and its specific treatment of newly discovered 
evidence as a ground for a motion for new trial. This 
ground remains, however, as a basis for a motion for new 
trial served not later than 10 days after the entry of 
judgment. See also Rule 60(b). 
As to the effect of a motion under subdivision (b) upon 
the running of appeal time, see amended Rule 73(a) ami 
Note. 
Subdivision (e). This subdivision has been added to 
care for a situation such as that arising in Boaz v. Mutual 
Life Ins. Co. of New York, C.C.A.8,1944,146 F.2d 321, and 
makes clear that the district court possesses the power 
asserted in that case to alter or amend a judgment after 
its entry. The subdivision deals only with alteration or 
amendment of the original judgment in a case and does 
not relate to a judgment upon motion as provided in Rule 
50(b). As to the effect of a motion under subdivision (e) 
upon the running of appeal time, see amended Rule 73(a) 
and Note. 
The title of Rule 59 has been expanded to indicate the 
inclusion of this subdivision. 
1966 AMENDMENT 
By narrow interpretation of Rule 59(b) and (d), it has 
been held that the trial court is without power to grant a 
motion for a new trial, timely served, by an order made 
more than 10 days after the entry of judgment, based 
upon a ground not stated in the motion but perceived and 
relied on by the trial court sua sponte. Freid v. McGrath, 
133 F.2d 350 (D.C.Cir.1942); National Farmers Union 
Auto. & Cas. Co. v. Wood, 207 F.2d 659 (10th Cir. 1953); 
Bailey v. Slentz, 189 F.2d 406 (10th Cir. 1951); Marshall's 
U. S. Auto Supply, Inc. v. Cashman, 111 F.2d 140 (10th Cir. 
1940), cert, denied, 311 U.S. 667 (1940); but see Steinberg 
v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 36 F.R.D. 253 (E.D.La.1964). 
The result is undesirable. Just as the court has power 
under Rule 59(d) to grant a new trial of its own initiative 
within the 10 days, so it should have power, when an 
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effective new trial motion has been made and is pending, 
to dwide it on grounds thought meritorious by the court 
although not advanced in the motion. The second sen-
tence added by amendment to Rule 59(d) confirms the 
court's power in the latter situation, with provision that 
the parties be afforded a hearing before the power is 
exercised. See 6 Moore's Federal Practice, par. 59.09[2] 
(2d e i 1953). 
In considering whether a given ground has or has not 
been advanced in the motion made by the party, it should 
be borne in mind that the particularity called for in 
stating the grounds for a new trial motion is the same as 
that required for all motions by Rule 7(b)(1). The latter 
rule does not require ritualistic detail but rather a fair 
indication to court and counsel of the substance of the 
grounds relied on. See Lebeck v. William A. Jarvis Co., 
250 F.2d 285 (3d Cir. 1957); Tsai v. Rosenthal, J)7 F.2d 
614 (8th Cir. 1961); Genera/ Motors Corp. v. Perry, 303 
F.2d [44 (7th Cir. 1962); cf. Grimm v. California Sprav-
Chemical Corp., 264 F.2d 145 (9th Cir. 1959); Cooper V. 
Midwest Feed Products Co., 271 F.2d 177 (8th Cir. 1959). 
R u l e 6 0 . Relief from Judgment or Order 
(a) Clerical Mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judg-
ments, orders or other parts of the record and errors 
therein arising from oversight or omission may be 
corrected by the court at any time of its own 
initiative or on the motion of any party and after 
such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the 
pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so 
corrected before the appeal is docketed in the appel-
late court, and thereafter while the appeal is pond-
ing may be so corrected with leave of the appellate 
court. 
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Ne-
glect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, etc. 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
court may relieve a party or his legal representative 
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the 
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, sur-
prise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered 
evidence which by due diligence could not have been 
discovered in time to move for a new trial under 
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denomi-
nated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or 
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judg-
ment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, 
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon 
which it is based has been reversed or otherwise 
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judg-
ment should have prospective application; or (6) 
any other reason justifying relief from the opera-
tion of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), 
and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, 
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A mo-
tion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the 
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. 
This rule does not limit the power of a court to 
tals, See Title 28 U.S.C.A. 
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT Rule 60 
entertain an independent action to relieve a party 
from a judhTnent, order, or proceeding, or to grant 
relief to a defendant not actually personally noti-
fied as provided in Title 28, U.S.C., § 1655, or to set 
aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. Writs 
of coram nobis, coram vobis, audita querela, and 
bills of review and bills in the nature of a bill of 
review, are abolished, and the procedure for obtain-
ing any relief from a judgment shall be by motion 
as prescribed in these rules or by an independent 
action. 
(As amended Dec. 27, 1946, eff. Mar. 19, 1948; Dec. 29, 
1948, eff. Oct. 20, 1949.) 
NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES 
Note to Subdivision (a). See former Equity Rule 72 
(Correction of Clerical Mistakes in Orders and Decrees); 
Mich. Court Rules Ann. (Searl, 1933) Rule 48, § 3; 2 
Wash.Rev.Stat.Ann. (Remington, 1932) § 464(3); Wyo. 
Rev.SUt.Arm., (Courtnght, 1931) § 89-2301(3). For an 
example of a very liberal provision for the correction of 
clerical errors and for amendment after judgment, vjee 
Va.Code Arm. (Michie, 1936) §§ 6329, 6333. 
Note to Subdivision (b). Application to the court under 
this subdivision does not extend the time for taking an 
appeal, as distinguished from the motion for new trial. 
This section is based upon Calif.Code Civ.Proc. (Deering, 
1937) § 473. See also N.Y.C.P.A., 1937, § 108; 2 Minn. 
Stat., Mason, 1927, § 9283. 
For the independent action to relieve against mistake, 
etc. see Dobie, Federal Procedure, pages 760-765, compare 
639; and Simkins, Federal Practice, ch. CXXI, pp. 820-
830, and ch. CXXII, pp. 831-834, compare § 214. 
1946 AMENDMENT 
Note to Subdivision (a). The amendment incorporates 
the view expressed in Perl man v. 322 West Seventy-
Second Street Co., Inc., C.C.A.2, 1942, 127 F.2d 716; 3 
Moore's Federal Practice, 1938, 3276, and further permits 
correction after docketing, with leave of the appellate 
court. Some courts have thought that upon the taking of 
an appeal the district court lost its power to act. See 
Schram v. Safety Investment Co., Mich.1942, 45 F.Supp. 
636; also Miller v. United States, C.C.A.7, 1940, 114 F.2d 
267. 
Note to Subdivision (b). When promulgated, the rules 
contained a number of provisions, including those found in 
Rule 60(b), describing the practice by a motion to obtain 
relief from judgments, and these rules, coupled with the, 
reservation in Rule 60(b) of the right to entertain a new 
action to relieve a party from a"judgment, were generally 
supposed to cover the field. Since the rule's have been in 
force, decisions have l>een rendered that the use of bills of 
review, coram nobis, or audita querela, to obtain relief 
from final judgments is still proper, and that various 
remedies of this kind still exist although they are not 
mentioned in the rules and the practice is not prescribed n 
the rules. It is obvious that the rules should be complete 
in this respect and define the practice with respect to any 
existing rights or remedies to obtain relief from final 
judgments. For extended discussion of the old common 
law writs and equitable remedies, the interpretation of 
Rule 60, and proposals for change, see Moore and Rogei*s, 
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Federal Relief from Civil Judgments, 1946, 55 Yale L.J. 
623. See also 3 Moore's Federal Practice, 1938, 3254 et 
seq.; Commentary, Effect of Rule 60b on Other Methods 
of Relief From Judgment, 1941, 4 Fed.Rules Serv. 942, 
f>45; Wallace v. United States, C.C.A.2, 1944,142 F.2d 240, 
certiorari denied 65 S.Ct. 37, 323 U.S. 712, 89 L.Ed. 573. 
The reconstruction of Rule 60(b) has for one of its 
purposes a clarification of this situation. Two types of 
procedure to obtain relief from judgments are specified in 
the rules as it is proposed to amend them. One procedure 
is by motion in tne court and in the action in which the 
judgment was rendered. The other procedure is by a new 
or independent action to obtain relief from a judgment, 
which action may or may not be begun in the court which 
rendered the judgment. Various rules, such as the one 
dealing with a motion for new trial and for amendment of 
judgments, Rule 59, one for amended findings, Rule 52, 
and one for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, Rule 
50(b), and including the provisions of Rule 60(b) as amend-
ed, prescribe the various types of cases in which the 
practice by motion is permitted. In each case there is a 
limit upon the time within which resort to a motion is 
permitted, and this time limit may not be enlarged under 
Rule 6(b). If the right to make a motion is lost by the : 
expiration oFtTie time limits fixed in these rules, the only 
other procedural re medy is by anew or independent action 
io set aside a lulfemenl upon those principles which haye 
heretofore been applied in such an action. Where the i 
inde[>endent actun is resorted to, the limitations of time 
are those of laches or statutes of limitations. The Com-
mittee, has endeavored to ascertain all the remedies and 
types of relief heretofore available by coram nobis, coram 
vobis, audita querela, bill of review, or bill in the nature of 
a bill of review. See Moore and Rogers, Federal Relief 
from Civil Judgments, 1946, 55 Yale L.J. 623, 659-682. J t . 
endeavored then to amend the rules to permit, either by 
"motion or by independent action, the granting of various 
Rinds of relief from judgments which were permitted in 
"thefederal courts prior to the adoption ot these rules, a!hd 
the"amendmenCconcludes with a provision abolishing the 
use of bills of revlew and the other common law wr!ts 
referred to, and requiring the practice to be by motion or 
by independent action. 
To Illustrate the operation of the amendment, it will be 
noted that under Rule 59(b) as it now stands, without 
amendment, a motion for new trial on the ground of 
newly discovered evidence is permitted within ten days 
after the entry of the judgment, or after that time upon 
leave of the court. It is proposed to amend Rule 59(b) by 
providing that under that rule a motion for new trial shall 
be served not later than ten days after the entry of the 
judgment, whatever the ground be for the motion, wheth-
er error by the court or newly discovered evidence. On 
the other hand, one of the purposes of the bill of review in 
equity was to afford relief on the ground of newly discov-
ered evidence long after the entry of the judgment. 
Therefore, to [>ermit relief by a motion similar to that 
heretofore obtained on bill of review, Rule 60(b) as amend-
ed permits an application for relief to be made by motion, 
on the ground of newly discovered evidence, within one 
year after judgment. Such a motion under Rule 60(b) 
does not affect the finality of the judgment, but a motion 
under Rule 59, made within 10 days, does affect finality 
and the running of the time for appeal. 
irials, See Title 28 U.S.C.A. 
Rule 60 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
If these various amendments, including principally those 
to Rule 60(b), accomplish the purpose for which they are 
intended, the federal rules will deal with the practice in 
every sort of case in which relief from final judgments is 
asked, and prescribe the practice. With reference to the"T 
question whether, as the rules now exist, relief by coram I 
nobis, bills of teview, and so forth, is permissible, the j 
generally accepted view is that the remedies are still! 
available, although the precise relief obtained in a particu- j 
lar case by use of these ancillary remedies is shrouded in J 
ancient lore and mystery. See Wallace v. United States, 
C.C.A.2, 1944, 142 F.2d 240, certiorari denied 65 S.Ct. 37, 
323 U.S. 712, 89 L.Ed. 573; Fraser v. Doing, App.D.C.1942, 
130 F.2d 617; Jones v. Tfatts, C.C.A.5, 1944, 142 F.2d 575; 
Preveden v. Hahn, N.Y.1941, 36 F.Supp. 952; Cavallo v. 
Agwilines, Inc., N.Y.1942, 6 Fed.Rules Serv. 60b.31, Case 2, 
2 F.R.D. 526; McGinn v. United States, D.Mass.1942, 6 
Fed.Rules Serv. 60b.51, Case 3, 2 F.R.D. 562; City of 
Shattuck, Oklahoma ex rei Versluis v. Oliver, Okl.1945, 8 
Fed.Rules Serv. 60b.31, Case 3; Moore and Rogers, Feder-
al Relief from Civil Judgments, 1946, 55 Yale L.J. 623, 
631-653; 3 Moore's Federal Practice, 1938, 3254 et seq.; 
Commentary Effect of Rule 60b on Other Methods of 
Relief from Judgments, op. cit. supra. Cf. Norris v. Camp, 
C.C.A.10,1944, 144 F.2d 1; Reed v. South Atlantic Steam-
ship Co. of Delaware, Del.1942, 2 F.R.D. 475, 6 Fed.Rules* 
Serv. 60b.31, Case 1; Laughlin v. Berens, D.C.1945, 8*" 
*Fed.Rules Serv. 60b.51, Case 1, 73 W.L.R. 209. 
The transposition of the words "the court" and the 
addition of the word "and" at the beginning of the first 
sentence are merely verbal changes. The addition of the 
qualifying word "final" emphasizes the character of the 
judgments, orders or proceedings from which Rule 60(b) 
affords relief; and hence interlocutory judgments are not 
brought within the restrictions of the rule, but rather they 
are left subject to the complete power of the court render-
ing them to afford such relief from them as justice re- * 
quires. 
The qualifying pronoun "his" has been eliminated on the 
bas\s that it is too restrictive, and that the subdivision" 
should include the mistake or neglect of others which may 
be just as material and call just as much for supervisory 
Jurisdiction as where the judgment is taken against the 
party through his mistake, inadvertence, etc. 
Fraud, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, misrepresentation, 
or other misconduct of an adverse party are express 
grounds for relief by motion under amended subdivision 
(b). There is no sound reason for their exclusion. The 
incorporation of fraud and the like within the scope of the 
rule also removes confusion as to the proper procedure. It 
has been held that relief from a judgment obtained by 
extrinsic fraud could be secured by motion within a "rea-
sonable time," which might be after the time stated in the 
rule had run. Fiske v. Buder, C.C.A.8, 1942, 125 F.2d 841; 
see also inferentially Bucy v. Nevada Construction Co., 
C.C.A.9, 1942, 125 F.2d 213. On the other hind, it has 
been suggested that in view of the fact that fraud was 
omitted from original Rule 60(b) as a ground fcr relief, an 
independent action was the only proper remedy. Com-
mentary, Effect of Rule 60b on Other Methods of Relief 
From Judgment, 1941, 4 Fed.Rules Serv. 942, 945. The 
amendment settles this problem by making fruid an ex-
press ground for relief by motion; and under the saving 
clause, fraud may be urged as a basis for relief by inde-
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pendent action insofar as established doctrine permits. 
See Moore and Rogers Federal Relief from Civil Judg-
ments, 1946, 55 Yale LJ. 623, 65S-659; 3 Moore's Federal 
Practice, 1938, 3267 et seq. And the rule expressly does 
not limit the power of the court, when fraud ha,= been 
perpetrated upon it, to give relief under the saving clause. 
As an illustration of this situation, see Hazel-Atlas Glass 
Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., 1944, 64 S.Ct. 997, 322 U.S. 
238, 88 L.Ed. 1250. 
The time limit for relief by motion in the court and in 
the action in which the judgment was rendered ha^ been 
enlarged from six months to one year 
It should be noted that Rule 60(b) does not assume to 
define substantive law as to the grounds for vacating 
judgments, but merely prescribes the practice in proceed-
ings to obtain relief. It should also be noted that under 
§ 20(i(4) of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 
1940, 50 U.S.C., Appendix, § 501 et seq. [§ 52TVU], a 
judgment rendered in any action or proceeding governed 
by the section may be vacated under certain ^prcified 
circumstances upon proper application to the court 
1948 AMENDMENT 
The amendment effective October 1949, substituted the 
reference to "Title 28, U.S.C., § 1655," in the next to the 
last sentence of subdivision (b), for the reference tx» "Sec-
tion 57 of the Judicial Code, U.S.C., Title 28, § 118." 
R u l e 6 1 . Harmless Error 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion 
of evidence and no error or defect in any ruling or 
order or in anything done or omitted by the court or 
by any of the parties is ground for granting a new 
trial or for setting aside a verdict or for vacating, 
modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or 
order, unless refusal to take such action appears to 
the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The 
court at every stage of the proceeding must disre-
gard any error or defect in the proceeding which 
does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 
NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES 
A combination of U.S.C., Title 28, § 2111, former § 391 
(New trials; harmless error) and former § 777 (Defects of 
form; amendments) with modifications See MrCandless 
v. United States, 1936, 56 S.Ct. 764, 298 U.S. 342, 80 L Ed. 
1205. Compare former Equity Rule 72 (Correction of 
Clerical Mistakes in Orders and Decrees); and last sen-
tence of former Equity Rule 46 (Trial—Testimony U dually 
Taken in Open Court—Rulings on Objections to Evick nee). "* 
For the last sentence see the last sentence of formers-
Equity Rule 19 (Amendments Generally) 
R u l e 6 2 . Stay of Proceedings to Enforce a 
Judgment 
(a) Automatic Stay; Exceptions—Injunctions, 
Receiverships, and Patent Accountings. Except 
as stated herein, no execution shall issue upon a 
judgment nor shall proceedings be taken for its 
enforcement until the expiration of 10 days aft'T its 
entry Unless otherwise ordered by the cour:, an 
ials. See Title 28 U.S.C.A. 
